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Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To max-
imize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred herein as customers and
suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension between recommending more suppliers
to customers for potential matches, and avoiding collisions that arise when customers are given
more choice (and end up choosing the same suppliers). We introduce a stylized model to study
the above trade-off. The platform offers each customer a menu of suppliers, and customers choose,
simultaneously and independently, to either select a supplier from their menu or remain unmatched.
Suppliers then see the set of customers that have selected them, and choose to either match with one
of these customers or remain unmatched. A match occurs if a customer and a supplier choose each
other (in sequence). Agents’ choices are probabilistic, and proportional to the public scores of agents
in their menu and a score that is associated with the outside option of remaining unmatched. The
platform’s problem is to construct menus for customers to maximize the total number of matches.
We first show that this problem is strongly NP-hard, and then provide an efficient algorithm that
achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal expected number of matches. Our algo-
rithm uses bucketing techniques (grouping similar suppliers into buckets), together with a linear
programming based relaxation and rounding. We finally provide simulations to better understand
how the algorithm might behave in practice.
1 Introduction
Two-sided platforms, that enable agents from one side to match and transact with agents on the
other side, are now ubiquitous in a variety of markets such as those for labor, dating, accommoda-
tion rentals, etc. Many such online platforms, rather than determining who matches with whom in
a centralized fashion, operate by presenting users with a set of recommended partners and allowing
them to choose which of these to pursue a match with. For example, when looking for accommoda-
tion on Airbnb, a potential guest is immediately shown a map containing up to twenty properties
available in the time frame she selects; the guest can then choose which of these property owners
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to contact. Similarly, clients looking for freelancers on Upwork or dog owners looking for a sitter
on Rover are also presented with a set of options for them to consider, before deciding which one
to reach out to. Therefore, a question that is central to the operations of many of these platforms
is to optimize the recommendations over potential partners that are presented to its users.
A natural objective in many of the aforementioned markets is to maximize the total number
of matches (e.g., number of bookings, tasks completed) that occur through the platform. A key
feature that the platform must account for is that a match between two users occurs only when
both users find each other acceptable. For instance, once a dog sitter is contacted, she needs to be
willing to perform the job; similarly, a host offering a vacation rental needs to accept the guest’s
request to book the same. Moreover, when many conflicting requests are received at the same time,
at most one such request can be accepted.
To describe the trade-off that then arises, let us refer to the two sides of the market by customers
and suppliers, respectively, where we assume that costumers (potential guests, clients, dog owners)
are presented with recommended assortments of potential suppliers (properties, freelancers, dog
sitters) to choose from. Naturally, increasing the number and mix of potential suppliers presented
to a costumer increases the chances that she finds an acceptable partner and reaches out to one
of them instead of choosing not to pursue a match through the platform at all. However, if as a
result the same supplier is shown to many customers, this also increases the chances that a supplier
is contacted by many customers with conflicting requests at the same time, resulting in collisions
as only one such request can be accepted. In a setting where suppliers are indeed products (i.e.,
in commodity markets) and do not have preferences, these collisions tend to bad for the platform,
as the platform could naturally increase the number of transactions by redirecting some of these
costumers to other products. However, in a two-sided market, having a supplier receiving many
requests might indeed increase the number of matches as this may increase the chances she finds a
customer she prefers over her outside option.
Motivated by the above discussion, this paper studies how to optimize over the assortments
of recommended potential partners that are shown to each user so as to maximize the number of
matches. Our contributions are along two lines: we propose a novel stylized model that captures
the aforementioned tradeoffs, and we propose a simple algorithm that achieves a constant-factor
approximation to the optimal number of matches.
In our a stylized model, suppliers are heterogeneous across two dimensions: their public “at-
tractiveness” to customers and the value for their outside option, that is known to the platform.
Matching decisions occur sequentially in two stages as follows. First, each costumer is presented
with a menu of suppliers chosen by the platform. Costumers choose, independently, either one
supplier from the menu or her outside option (i.e., to remain unmatched); following the tradition
of the assortment planning literature, we assume that choice model is given by the multinomial
logit (MNL). In the second stage, each supplier is presented with a menu containing only those
customers who have selected her in the first place. Each supplier then chooses either to match
with one of these customers or to use her outside option. A customer and a supplier match only if
they both chose each other. The platform’s two-sided sequential assortment problem is to choose a
menu of assortments to show to each customer so as to maximize the expected number of matches.
Our first result is to establish that the platform’s optimization problem is NP-hard. Following
this hardness result, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves a constant-factor ap-
proximation ratio to the optimal number of expected matches. Our focus is not on finding the best
approximation ratio but rather on designing an intuitive and easy to implement algorithm, which
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somewhat resembles the current implementation of the assortment decisions in many marketplaces,
and to establish some performance guarantee on such algorithms. To design the algorithm, we
focus on two regimes: a low-value suppliers’ regime, where all suppliers are less attractive than the
customers’ outside options, and a high-value suppliers’ regime, where all suppliers are at least as
attractive as the customers’ outside options. We provide an efficient constant factor approximation
algorithm for constructing the menu sets in each regime. Combining these algorithms (in a black
box fashion) suffices to establish a constant-factor approximation for the general case.
The high-value suppliers’ regime is easier to analyze. In this regime, a customer is at least
as likely to choose any given supplier over her outside option. Informally, this implies that the
platform does not need to provide a lot of options to consumers in order for them to prefer one of
the suppliers in the platform over their outside option. In fact, we show that a menu set in which
each costumer is presented with a single supplier suffices to achieve a constant-factor approximation
guarantee.
The case with low-value suppliers is likely to be a better representation of the reality in many
online markets. In this setting, the outside option is (ex-ante) better than an any individual
option the platform can offer; this can be the case if, for example, the platform has a somewhat
strong competitor operating in the same space. Therefore, in principle, the platform might need
to offer larger assortments to the consumers, which is consistent with what is observed in practice.
Our algorithm works by bucketing (grouping) suppliers that have similar attractiveness scores and
similar value of their outside option in the same bucket. Using this buckets, we propose an LP
relaxation that provides an upper bound (up to constant factor) to the expected number of matches.
Our LP treats all suppliers in the same bucket as indistinguishable and tracks how many suppliers in
each bucket are shown to each user to maximize the expected number of matches.1 We then propose
a rounding algorithm that rounds the solution to the aforementioned LP and use the output to
construct the assortments for the customers. The key idea behind the menu constructing algorithm
is to show each supplier in the same bucket to approximately the same number of users. This turns
out to be useful to minimize collisions, i.e., situations where one supplier is being selected by too
many customers while a similar supplier is selected by too few of them. Moreover, our algorithm
has the intuitive property that the number of menus in which a supplier appears is upper bounded
by a constant that depends both on her value and the value of her outside option. In particular,
suppliers with lower values can be shown more than those with the same outside option and higher
values; this is because suppliers with lower values are less likely to be selected by consumers. On
the other hand, comparing suppliers with the same value, those with higher outside options can
be shown more often; this implies that, in expectation, such a supplier will be selected by more
consumers, increasing the chances that she will choose one of them to match in the platform.
The remainder paper is organized as follows. The model and problem are formalized in Section
2. Section 3 states an overview of the main results and techniques. Sections 4 and 5 provide
the main steps of proofs for low- and high-value suppliers’ regimes, respectively (with some details
relegated to the appendix). In Section 6, we provide simulation results to illustrate the performance
of the algorithm in some randomly generated instances. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize our
findings and discuss a range of open questions.
1This, for example, resembles what some dating platforms do, where users are as-
signed a unique ELO-type score, and assortments are decided using that score. Source:
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267772/tinder-elo-score-desirability-algorithm-how-works
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1.1 Related literature
The paper is related to several strands in the literature. The first strand is the literature on
assortment optimization in the context of revenue management. Following the seminal paper by
van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), which studies an assortment optimization problem for inventory
selection using the multinomial-logit framework, there has been a vast body of work in this area
models (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong et al. (2014); Me´ndez-Dı´az et al. (2014); Bront et al. (2009);
Gaur and Honhon (2006); Immorlica et al. (2018) and a survey by Ko¨k et al. (2008)). The key
difference between these studies (which address a variety of choice models, dynamics, constraints,
etc.), and our paper is that they consider one-sided markets in which the goal is to assign agents a
menu of goods (who have no preferences) in order to maximize revenue. In general, even one-sided
assortment planning problems are computationally hard, except for some notable cases such as
MNL without constraints on the offered sets Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004). Closer to our setting,
are those papers than incorporate capacity constraints bounding the number of goods of each type,
(Rusmevichientong et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2013); these capacities constraints are inherent in our
model, as users can only match once.
Preferences on both sides of the market add a new layer in comparison to the assortment
planning problem in commodity markets. While the literature of the latter problem is mature,
little is known about assortments in two-sided matching markets; see Shi (2016); Ashlagi and Shi
(2015) for studies in large two-sided markets.
Another stream of related papers considers the relationship between choices and congestion
in two-sided matching markets. The benefit from limiting the choices offered to users in a two-
sided market already appears in several studies (H. Halaburda and Yildirim, 2016; Arnosti et al.,
2014; Kanoria and Saban, 2017). However, these papers either do no explicitly allow the platform
to select an assortment for the users, or the users are ex-ante homogeneous in the eyes of the
platform. Our paper complements this line of work by considering a stylized static model while
allowing for more heterogeneity of agents and using the assortment shown to each user as a platform
lever.
More generally, this paper is related to the two-sided matching mechanisms. Stable mechanisms
typically elicits agents’ ranking lists and form stable matches. In our problem a model of choice
is estimated by the designer and (only first) choices are done in a decentralized manner. Our
choice model, however, is similar to the a preference formation in several papers in this literature
(Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2014).
Finally, we note the key difference between our problem and (online) stochastic bipartite match-
ing (Feldman et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Manshadi et al., 2012; Haeupler et al., 2011). In this
literature the planner makes matches given some distribution over edges. In our model, the plat-
form only offers a set and users to choose from, which inherently creates collisions due to lack of
coordination.
1.2 Related literature
The paper is related to several strands in the literature. The first strand is the literature on
assortment optimization in the context of revenue management. Following the seminal paper by
van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999), which studies an assortment optimization problem for inventory
selection using the multinomial-logit framework, there has been a vast body of work in this area
models (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong et al. (2014); Me´ndez-Dı´az et al. (2014); Bront et al. (2009);
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Gaur and Honhon (2006); Immorlica et al. (2018) and a survey by Ko¨k et al. (2008)). The key
difference between these studies (which address a variety of choice models, dynamics, constraints,
etc.), and our paper is that they consider one-sided markets in which the goal is to assign agents a
menu of goods (who have no preferences) in order to maximize revenue. In general, even one-sided
assortment planning problems are computationally hard, except for some notable cases such as
MNL without constraints on the offered sets Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004). Closer to our setting,
are those papers than incorporate capacity constraints bounding the number of goods of each type,
(Rusmevichientong et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2013); these capacities constraints are inherent in our
model, as users can only match once.
Preferences on both sides of the market add a new layer in comparison to the assortment
planning problem in commodity markets. While the literature of the latter problem is mature,
little is known about assortments in two-sided matching markets; see Shi (2016); Ashlagi and Shi
(2015) for studies in large two-sided markets.
Another stream of related papers considers the relationship between choices and congestion
in two-sided matching markets. The benefit from limiting the choices offered to users in a two-
sided market already appears in several studies (H. Halaburda and Yildirim, 2016; Arnosti et al.,
2014; Kanoria and Saban, 2017). However, these papers either do no explicitly allow the platform
to select an assortment for the users, or the users are ex-ante homogeneous in the eyes of the
platform. Our paper complements this line of work by considering a stylized static model while
allowing for more heterogeneity of agents and using the assortment shown to each user as a platform
lever.
More generally, this paper is related to the two-sided matching mechanisms. Stable mechanisms
typically elicits agents’ ranking lists and form stable matches. In our problem a model of choice
is estimated by the designer and (only first) choices are done in a decentralized manner. Our
choice model, however, is similar to the a preference formation in several papers in this literature
(Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2014).
Finally, we note the key difference between our problem and (online) stochastic bipartite match-
ing (Feldman et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Manshadi et al., 2012; Haeupler et al., 2011). In this
literature the planner makes matches given some distribution over edges. In our model, the plat-
form only offers a set and users to choose from, which inherently creates collisions due to lack of
coordination.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce a stylized model to capture the problem faced by a platform that must
recommend assortments to her customers so as to maximize the number of matches in a two-sided
sequential matching market. We start by formally introducing the model. Afterwards, we discuss
some of the modeling assumptions.
Problem setup. We consider a platform, consisting of a set of customers and suppliers, who
must construct assortments of suppliers to recommend to her costumers. In our simplified setting,
events occur sequentially as follows. First, the platform chooses the menu profile, which consist of
a menu (subset) of suppliers that will be shown to each customer. Second, customers observe their
menus and, simultaneously and independently, choose at most one supplier from their menu. Third,
each supplier observes all customers who chose her, and chooses at most one customer from this
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set to match with. (Below, we describe how customers and suppliers make their choices.) When a
customer is chosen by a supplier, this results in a match. The platform chooses a menu profile to
maximize the expected number of matches.
In more detail, there is a set of customers indexed by M = {1, . . . ,m}, and a set of suppliers,
N = {1, . . . , n}, affiliated to the platform. The platform chooses a profile of menus M¯ = {Mi}i∈M,
where Mi ⊆ N is the subset of suppliers that is shown to customer i ∈ M. We refer to the menu
profile also as a menu set.
We assume each supplier j ∈ N has an associated score vj > 0, which represents the (ex-
ante) consumer preference values. Moreover, every customer has an outside option indexed by 0;
we assume all customers’ outside options score are identical and normalized to v0 = 1. Given a
menu profile {Mi}i∈M, each customer i ∈ M simultaneously and independently chooses at most
one supplier from the her menu Mi according to a multinomial logit model. That is, given that
customer i is assigned menu Mi, she chooses j ∈Mi ∪ {0} with probability
pij(Mi) =
vj∑
k∈Mi
vk + v0
. (1)
Hence, the probability that i selects a supplier from menu Mi is given by∑
k∈Mi
vk∑
k∈Mi
vk + v0
. (2)
Once customers’ choices are made, each supplier j ∈ N is presented with a menu Mj = {i ∈
M : j ∈ Mi and i chose supplier j}. Given these menus, each supplier j ∈ N chooses i ∈ Mj ∪{0}
where 0 denotes an the supplier’s outside option. As consumers, we also assume that suppliers
also make choices using a multinomial logit model. However, we make two different assumptions.
First, every customer i ∈ M has the same public score normalized to qi = 1. Second, we allow
suppliers to have different outside options. That is, every supplier j ∈ N has an outside option
score qj ≥ 0. Then, if supplier j observes menu Mj 6= ∅, where Mj is the set of customers that
chose j, the probability that j chooses any given customer i ∈ Mj is
1
|Mj |+qj
, and the probability
that j chooses any customer (as opposed to choosing her outside option) is
|Mj |
|Mj|+qj
. Note that if
no customer chose supplier j, j must remain unmatched.
We assume that the choice models of suppliers and customers (public and outside option scores)
are known to the platform. The platform must select a menu profile to maximize the expected
number of matches. Formally, we define the two-sided sequential assortment problem as follows:
Definition 1 (Two-sided sequential assortment problem). Given a set of customers M and set
of suppliers N with associated non-negative public scores {vj}j∈N and non-negative outside option
scores {qj}j∈N , the platform chooses a menu profile {Mi}i∈M, which consists of a menu of suppliers
to be shown to each customer, in order to maximize the expected number of matches.
Modeling tradeoffs and assumptions. The above model, while simple, captures the main
dynamics and tradeoffs faced by a platform when recommending suppliers to her consumers to
maximize the number of resulting matches. The first step towards match formation is to ensure
that consumers select a supplier in the platform. Recommending better and more suppliers to each
individual consumer increases the chances of each of them finding a supplier they like over their
outside option. However, as a supplier gets recommended to more consumers, this increases the
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chances that she gets selected by multiple such consumers, and these chances increases with the
quality of the supplier. This has two effects: it increases the probability of the supplier matching, as
it increases the changes the supplier chooses one of these consumers instead of her outside option,
but it may decrease the total number of matches as each supplier can match at most once (even if
she was selected by multiple consumers).
Simultaneous choices. Note that we assume that customers make their choices simultaneously. If we
consider instead a dynamic problem where each customer arrives, chooses a supplier and the supplier
then immediately responds, then this problem is similar to previous work on dynamic assortment
planning with inventory constraints (see, e.g., Golrezaei et al. (2014)). However, simultaneous
choices by all agents on the same side allow us to represent a settings where there might be a delay
between the costumer choice and the supplier response, for example, the supplier might check the
app once a day or, as in the case of some dating platforms, users see assortments only once per day.
User heterogeneity. Note that we assumed that suppliers are ex-ante heterogeneous across two
dimensions: their scores vjs and the values of their outside option, qjs. By contrast, consumers are
(ex-ante) identical from the platform’s perspective: we assume that each has a value vi = 1 and
the value of their outside option is v0 = 1. This is a reasonable assumption in many settings, where
the platform may have detailed information about the suppliers while she might either have very
little to no information about consumers, or about suppliers’ preferences. For example, in a setting
like Airbnb, the platform and the consumers can observe many metrics of the suppliers’ qualities
(property photos, location, and even past reviews) whereas the information regarding consumers
might not be as detailed, and even such information may be less relevant for the suppliers’ choice.
However, we believe that using similar bucketing ideas, a constant-factor approximation guarantee
can be achieved in the case of consumers having different scores as well.
3 Overview of results
In this section, we present an overview of the main results. Throughout the paper, we use boldface
to refer to random variables. We also use boldface to refer to name the optimization problems
presented later. In Appendix A, we state some standard results that will be used in our proofs.
Our first result is to show that the two-sided sequential assortment problem is NP-Hard.
Proposition 1. The two-sided sequential assortment problem is strongly NP-hard.
The proof2 can be found in Appendix B. There, we use a reduction from the 3-partition problem,
which is known to be strongly NP-complete (Garey and Johnson, 2002). This result is not surpris-
ing, given that assortment planning problems tend to be computationally hard even in simpler
one-sided settings.
The hardness result above motivates us to find an alternative solution. We propose simple
and intuitive algorithms, and then show that these indeed achieve constant-factor approximation
guarantees.
Formally, we say that a menu construction algorithm A has an approximation ratio α if the
expected number of matches (MA) achieved by the menu set returned by algorithm A is at least α
times the optimal expected number of matches opt. Formally,
E [MA] ≥ α · opt.
2The authors would like to thank Vineet Goyal for useful discussions and valuable suggestions.
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In our setting, we say that an algorithm is efficient if it runs in polynomial time in the number of
suppliers and customers.
Our main result is to provide an efficient constant-factor approximation algorithm, as summa-
rized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (General case). There exists an efficient algorithm for the sequential assortment
problem that runs in polynomial time (in the number of suppliers and customers) and that achieves
a constant approximation ratio.
In order to prove the above result, we analyze the problem in two different regimes, each of which
is interesting in its own right. The first regime, the low-value supplier regime, is when all suppliers
have scores vj < 1; the other regime, the high-value supplier regime, is when all suppliers have scores
vj ≥ 1. For each of these regimes, we provide an efficient constant factor approximation algorithm
for constructing the menu sets. Later, we propose an algorithm that combines the algorithms from
both these regimes (in a black box fashion), which achieves a constant factor approximation to the
general case.
The algorithms for both regimes follow a similar high-level strategy. First, we provide an
optimization problem that can be solved efficiently and is also an upper bound (up to a constant
factor) to our original objective. We then construct menu sets based on the solutions to these
(easy to solve) optimization problems, that further achieve a constant factor approximation to the
upper bounds and therefore a constant factor approximation to the original problem. Although,
the algorithms for the two special cases follow similar a strategy, the optimization problem that
upper bounds the original objective and the menu set construction algorithms are entirely different.
We describe these in some detail next.
Low-value suppliers’ case. The case with low-value suppliers (vj < 1) is likely to be a better
representation of the reality in many online platforms, but it is also a more technically challenging
case. Recall that we have normalized the customers outside option to be v0 = 1. Therefore, the
case with vj < 1 represents a setting where the outside option is (ex-ante) better than an any
individual option the platform can offer, and thus the platform should, in principle, offer larger
assortments to consumers. One possible scenario that this can represent when the platform has
a strong competitor, which is captured in reduced form by the customers’ outside option. Thus,
after a search, consumers are presented with many options. (For instance, after a search in Airbnb,
the default is for the potential guest to be presented with 20 options per page.) Next we state the
result that gives an efficient constant factor approximation algorithm for this case.
Theorem 3.2 (Low-value suppliers). Suppose that vj ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M such that the expected number
of matches is at least a constant fraction αL of the expected number of matches achieved by the
optimal menu set, where αL is some absolute constant.
To prove the above theorem, we first construct an LP optimization problem (Section 4.2), one
whose optimal solution upper bounds the expected number of matches obtained by an optimal menu
set (Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3). Crucial to defining this LP is a two-dimensional bucketing (grouping)
of the suppliers. In particular, we group suppliers that have similar scores vj and similar value of
their outside option qj in the same bucket. When constructing the LP, we treat all suppliers in
the same bucket as indistinguishable and we track how many suppliers in each bucket are shown
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to each user. We propose a rounding algorithm (Algorithm 1) that returns an integer solution and
approximates the optimal solution of the above LP (Lemma 4.5) by a constant factor. We then use
the output solution from the rounding algorithm as an input to Algorithm 2, which constructs the
menus for the customers. In other words, the algorithm takes as an input how many suppliers in
each bucket to be shown to each user, and construct the actual menus by choosing which suppliers
are shown to each user. The key idea behind the algorithm is to show each supplier in the same
bucket to approximately the same number of users, which is useful to minimize the probability that
cases where one supplier ends up being selected by too many customers while the other supplier
is selected by too few of them arise. Moreover, our algorithm has the intuitive property that, for
every supplier, the number of menus in which she appears is upper bounded by a constant that
depends both on her (representative) value and the (representative) value of her outside option.
Finally, to establish Theorem 3.2, we show how the menus thus constructed using Algorithm
2 result in an expected number of matches that are within a certain constant factor αL of the LP
relaxation upper bound and thus of the optimal menu set. We discuss the above techniques more
formally in Section 4.
High-value suppliers’ case. In the high-value supplier regime, all suppliers j ∈ N have scores
vj ≥ 1. As before, we also show that we can construct an efficient constant-factor approximation
algorithm for this case.
Theorem 3.3 (High-value suppliers). Suppose that vj ≥ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M, such that, the expected number
of matches is at least a constant fraction αH of the expected number of matches achieved by the
optimal menu set, where αH is some absolute constant.
For this case, we employ a different approach to that in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Recall that
we have normalized the value of customers’ outside option to be one. Therefore, in the high-value
suppliers regime, a customer is at least as likely to choose any given supplier over her outside
option. Informally, this implies that the platform does not need to provide a lot of variety to
consumers in order for them to prefer one of the suppliers in the platform over their outside option.
In order to establish the result, we first construct a combinatorial optimization problem that upper
bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set (Lemma 5.1). This
combinatorial optimization problem can be solved approximately (up to factor of 1/2) in polynomial
time (Lemma 5.2). Finally, we construct menu set based on the approximate solution, which can
then be guaranteed to achieve a constant factor approximation of the optimal expected number of
matches possible in this setting (Theorem 3.3). The menu set constructed by the algorithm results
in each costumer being presented with a single supplier, which basically helps the platform to avoid
lack of coordination on the consumer side. In our algorithms and results, we extensively exploiting
the fact that suppliers are of high value. For instance, this allows us to establish that the proposed
upper bound is be relatively tight. A detailed discussion of the proof of the above theorem can be
found in Section 5.
Finally, we show that the results for the two different cases above can be combined to give a
constant factor approximation to the original problem as showcased by the following result, the
proof of which is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 3.4. Fix the set of customers M and set of suppliers N with associated non-negative
public scores {vj}j∈N and non-negative outside option scores {qj}j∈N . Suppose that there exist
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efficient algorithms that achieve an approximation ratio of αL and αH for the low- and high-value
supplier cases, respectively. Then, there exists an efficient algorithm for the general two-sided
sequential assortment optimization problem such that the expected number of matches is at least a
fraction 12 min{αL, αH} of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set.
To conclude, note that Theorem 3.1 follows immediately by the previous results as, by Theo-
rem 3.4, the existence of the efficient constant-factor approximation algorithms for the low- and
high-value supplier cases (Theorems 3.2 and 3.3) guarantees the existence of a constant-factor
approximation algorithm for the general case.
4 Proof overview for the low-value suppliers’ case
In this section, we analyze the case where all suppliers j ∈ N have scores vj ≤ 1. We provide
an algorithm that outputs menu set {Mi}i∈M, such that the expected number of matches under
{Mi}i∈M is a constant-factor approximation to the expected number of matches achieved by the
optimal menu set.
The organization of this section is follows. In Section 4.1 we introduce notations and a prelim-
inary result. In Section 4.2 we provide a linear program using the idea of bucketing that upper
bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. This LP outputs a frac-
tional solution; in Section 4.3 we use this fractional solution as an input to a rounding algorithm
that outputs an integral solution and use this solution to construct a menu set that achieves a
constant-factor approximation to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu.
4.1 Preliminaries
We now provide the notations useful for the purpose of our analysis. Let opt be the expected
number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set. In the rest of the paper, we slightly abuse
notation and, when clear from the context, we refer to an optimization problem and to its optimal
value using the same name.
To simplify the exposition in the remaining of the section, we assume that all the suppliers have
outside option scores greater than one, i.e., for all j ∈ N we have qj ≥ 1. As we show by the end
of this subsection, this is without loss of generality up to constant factors.
To establish our result, we use the idea of bucketing, where we group suppliers into buckets,
where each bucket includes all suppliers that are “similar” in terms of both their value (public score)
and the value of their outside option. Therefore, we use a two-dimensional index k = (k1, k2) ∈ Z
2
≥0
for the buckets. The k-th bucket is given by
Sk
def
=
{
j ∈ N : vj ∈
[
1
2k1
,
1
2k1−1
)
R
and qj ∈ [2
k2 , 2k2+1)R
}
.
For bucket k, we define a representative score wk1 and a representative value of the outside option
as
wk1
def
=
1
2k1
and qk2
def
= 2k2 , (3)
respectively. Note that for any j ∈ Sk, we have that wk1 ≤ vj ≤ 2wk1 and qk2 ≤ qj ≤ 2qk2 . We
use B1 and B2 to denote the set of all wk1 and qk2 values, respectively, corresponding to non-
empty buckets. Further, let the set of all non-empty bucket indices be denoted by B, that is,
B
def
= {k = (k1, k2) ∈ B1 ×B2 : |Sk| ≥ 1}.
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To conclude, we show that it is without loss (up to constant factors) to assume that all suppliers
have qj ≥ 1. To show this, we consider the following two settings.
Original setting: Let M and N be the set of customers and suppliers, respectively. For each
supplier j ∈ N let vj ≤ 1 and qj be her score and outside option, respectively.
We define a new setting by modifying the outside option scores for a subset of suppliers. For
the new setting let S
def
= {j ∈ N | qj < 1}.
New setting: Consider an instance from the original setting, and define an instance for the new
setting where, v′j and q
′
j, the score and outside option of supplier j ∈ N in the new setting are
defined as follows:
v′j
def
= vj for all j ∈ N q
′
j
def
=
{
1 if j ∈ S,
qj otherwise.
We now state the following result, which is proved in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1. Fix any feasible menu set {Mi}i∈M for customers, and let M and M
′ be the random
variables counting the number of matches obtained when using {Mi}i∈M in the original and in the
new setting, respectively. Then,
E
[
M′
]
≤ E [M] ≤ 2E
[
M′
]
.
4.2 An upper bound
The objective of this subsection is to provide a linear program that, up to constant factors, upper
bounds the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set. The proposed linear
program essentially chooses, for each customer, how many suppliers in a given bucket to show to
her.
In route towards defining our linear program, for each customer i ∈ M and each supplier j ∈ N ,
define a variable xi,j which takes value 1 if j is present in i’s menu and 0 otherwise. In addition,
for every i ∈ M and k ∈ B define a variable xi,k which counts the number of suppliers from bucket
k present in i’s menu, i.e., xi,k
def
=
∑
j∈Sk
xi,j and thus 0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk|. Using this definition, we
will derive some upper bounds on the expected number of matches that will constitute the basis
for our linear program.
Consider a the menu set given by x = {xi,j}i∈M,j∈N . Let Xk for all k = (k1, k2) ∈ B be the
random variable counting the number of customers that choose a supplier from bucket k. Similarly,
let Xk,j be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose supplier j from
bucket k. Observe that
Xk =
∑
j∈Sk
Xk,j. (4)
By linearity of expectation and the definition of the representative scores ws (see (3)), the expected
value of Xk satisfies
E [Xk] =
∑
j∈Sk
E [Xk,j] =
∑
j∈Sk
∑
i∈M
vjxi,j
1 +
∑
j′∈N vj′xi,j′
≤ 2
∑
i∈M
wk1xi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈B wk′1xi,k′
. (5)
where we used that vj ≤ 2wk1 for all j ∈ Sk and that
∑
j′∈N vj′xi,j′ ≥
∑
k′∈Bwk′1xi,k′.
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For k ∈ B and supplier j in bucket k, let Yk,j denote the random variable representing whether
supplier j is matched, and let Yk be the random variable counting the number of matches in the
platform involving suppliers from bucket k. The expected value of Yk satisfies
E [Yk] = E

∑
j∈Sk
E [Yk,j|Xk,j]

 = E

∑
j∈Sk
Xk,j
qj +Xk,j

 ≤ E

∑
j∈Sk
Xk,j
qk2 +Xk,j

 . (6)
The second equality follows from the suppliers’ choice model and the fact that suppliers value all
customers who chose them equally at vi = 1, and the inequality follows since qj ≥ qk2 for all j ∈ Sk.
We next provide an upper bound on the expected value of Yk that turns out to be easier to work
with for optimization purposes. Note that, for each j ∈ Sk, the expression
Xk,j
qk2+Xk,j
is upper bounded
by min
{
Xk,j
qk2
, 1
}
. Further, by Jensen’s inequality we have E
[
min
{
Xk,j
qk2
, 1
}]
≤ min
{
E
[
Xk,j
qk2
]
, 1
}
.
Combining the above two observations together with the linearity of expectation and Equation (6),
we obtain that
E [Yk] ≤
∑
j∈Sk
min
{
E
[
Xk,j
qk2
]
, 1
}
≤ min


∑
j∈Sk
E
[
Xk,j
qk2
]
, |Sk|


= min
{
1
qk2
E [Xk] , |Sk|
}
≤ min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′1xi,k′
, |Sk|
}
,
(7)
where the second inequality follows because min{.} is a concave function and the last inequality
follows from Equation (5). Note that the variables xi,k are sufficient (and we don’t need xi,j
variables) to provide an upper bound on the expected number of matches. Therefore, for our
purposes, we will treat all suppliers in the same bucket as indistinguishable and we track how many
suppliers in bucket k are shown to each user.
Based on the above discussion and on the expression obtained in Equation (7), we define the
following optimization problem:
fopt
def
= max
x
∑
k∈B
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′1xi,k′
, |Sk|
}
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
(8)
The optimal value of the above optimization problem upper bounds the value of the expected
number of matches achieved by the optimal menu. This is formalized in the following lemma,
which is formally proved in Appendix C.1.
Lemma 4.2 (fopt upper bounds opt). opt ≤ fopt .
Next, we provide an LP formulation that approximates optimization problem (8) and therefore,
up to constant factors, upper bounds the value of expected number of matches achieved by the
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optimal menu.
lpopt
def
= max
x
∑
k∈B
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k
s.t.
∑
k′∈B
wk′
1
xi,k′ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M,
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all k ∈ B
0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
(9)
Lemma 4.3 (lpopt approximates fopt). 12fopt ≤ lpopt ≤ 2fopt.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 can be found in Appendix C.1. Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 together
establish that the the optimal fractional solution to the optimization problem (9) with objective
value lpopt upper bounds opt:
Corollary 4.4 (lpopt upper bounds opt). opt ≤ 2lpopt.
4.3 Rounding, menu characterization, and constant-factor approximation guar-
antee
Next, we provide the rounding algorithm for the fractional solution returned by problem (9). Later,
using the output of the rounding algorithm, we provide an algorithm to construct the menu for
each customer. Finally, we argue that the expected number of matches achieved by the constructed
menu yields a constant approximation to the optimal menu. We now provide the description of our
rounding algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1: Rounding
Input: The optimal (fractional) solution to problem (9), x∗.
Output: An integral solution x that satisfies the properties stated in Lemma 4.5.
Algorithm
For all i ∈ M and k ∈ B, assign xi,k = ⌊x
∗
i,k⌋ if x
∗
i,k ≥ 1
For all ℓ ∈ B1 and i ∈ M, initialize yi,ℓ = 0.
for ℓ ∈ B1 do
for k ∈ B and wk1 = ℓ do
Let sk =
∑
{i∈M: x∗
ik
<1} x
∗
ik. Pick ⌈sk⌉ customers with minimum yi,ℓ values (breaking
ties arbitrarily) in the set {i ∈ M : x∗ik < 1}; for each such costumer i, set xi,k = 1
and increment yi,ℓ = yi,ℓ + 1.
end
end
We next characterize some properties of the output of the rounding algorithm.
Lemma 4.5. Algorithm 1 returns an integral solution x that satisfies the following properties:
1.
∑
k∈Bmin
{
2
qk2
∑
i∈Mwk1xi,k, |Sk|
}
≥ 12 lpopt.
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2. There exists a constant c ≥ 1 such that
∑
k′∈B wk′1xi,k′ ≤ c for all customers i ∈ M.
3. 2qk2
∑m
i=1 wk1xi,k ≤ |Sk|+
2wk1
qk2
for all k ∈ B.
The proof of Lemma 4.5 can be found in Appendix C.2. The first condition in the lemma implies
that the rounded solution x has an objective value at least 12 lpopt and therefore, up to constant
factors, is still an upper bound to the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu.
The second condition gives a constant factor upper bound for the expression
∑
k′∈Bwk′1xi,k′. This
inequality is used later to construct a menu set such that the mass of the menu assigned to each
customer i ∈M (i.e.,
∑
j∈Mi vj) of each customer is upper bounded by such constant. This will be
crucial to achieve the constant factor approximation to our problem (See proof of Theorem 3.2). The
third and the final property is useful in proving the guarantees achieved by the menu construction
algorithm presented next (See proof of Lemma 4.6 for further details).
We now focus on constructing a menu set using the integral solution returned by the rounding
algorithm. In particular, the xi,k variables are sufficient to upper bound the value of the expected
number of matches for the optimal menu set. We still need to construct the actual menu of suppliers
that are going to be shown to each customer. Next, we provide an algorithm to construct the menu
for each customer and prove that the menu set constructed by our algorithm achieves a constant
approximation to the optimal menu set.
ALGORITHM 2: Menu construction algorithm
Input: The assignment x returned by the rounding Algorithm 1.
Output: A menu set {Mi(x)}i∈M that it satisfies the properties in Lemma 4.6.
Set ck,j = 0 for all buckets k and for all j ∈ Sk.
for k ∈ B do
for i = 1 . . . m do
Pick xi,k suppliers from bucket k with minimum ck,j values (breaking ties arbitrarily),
increment their ck,j values by 1, and add these suppliers to menu Mi(x).
end
end
In the above algorithm, for each j ∈ Sk, the final value of ck,j is equal to the number of customers
i that satisfy j ∈ Mi(x). That is, ck,j tracks to many consumers j in bucket k is shown. Since all
customers are symmetric, we show next that it suffices to use the values of the ck,js to calculate
the expected number of matches.
Our next lemma provides some crucial properties of the ck,j values returned by the Algorithm 2,
the menu construction algorithm.
Lemma 4.6. The menu Mi(x) for all i ∈ M returned by Algorithm 2 satisfies the following
properties for each bucket k ∈ B
1.
∑
j∈Sk
ck,j =
∑
i∈M xi,k.
2. For all j ∈ Sk, ck,j ≤ 2 +
qk2
2wk1
.
The proof of Lemma 4.6 can be found in Appendix C.2. As the lemma establishes, our algorithm
has the intuitive property that the number of menus in which a supplier appears is upper bounded
by a constant that depends both on her (representative) value and the (representative) value of her
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outside option. In particular, suppliers with lower values can be shown more than those with the
same outside option and higher values; this is because suppliers with lower values are less likely to
be selected by consumers. On the other hand, comparing suppliers with the same value, those with
higher outside options can be shown more often; this implies that, in expectation, such a supplier
will be selected by more consumers, which is helpful increases the chances that she will choose one
of them to match in the platform.
We use these properties to establish the following theorem, which is our main result for this
section:
Theorem 3.2 (Low-value suppliers). Suppose that vj ≤ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M such that the expected number
of matches is at least a constant fraction αL of the expected number of matches achieved by the
optimal menu set, where αL is some absolute constant.
Proof. Let x be the assignment returned by Algorithm 1, and let {Mi(x)}i∈M be the menus gen-
erated by Algorithm 2. Given {Mi(x)}i∈M, let Xk be the random variable counting the number of
customers that choose a supplier from bucket k, and let Xk,j be the random variable counting the
number of customer that choose supplier j in bucket k. Let Yk be the random variable counting
the number of suppliers from bucket k that are matched. Also, let Yk,j be the random variable
representing whether supplier j in bucket k is matched. Clearly, Yk =
∑
j∈Sk
Yk,j and by taking
expectation on both sides, we have,
E [Yk] =
∑
j∈Sk
E [Yk,j] . (10)
Now fix a bucket k ∈ B and a supplier j ∈ Sk, the probability of j matching given Xk,j is:
P (Yk,j = 1|Xk,j) =
Xk,j
qj +Xk,j
≥
1
2
Xk,j
qk2 +Xk,j
, (11)
where the last inequality follows since qj ≤ 2qk2 .
Define µk,j
def
= E [Xk,j] and αi
def
=
∑
j∈Mi(x)
vj for all i ∈ M. Then, there exists a constant c
such that
αi =
∑
k∈B
∑
{j∈Sk:j∈Mi(x)}
vj ≤ 2
∑
k∈B
∑
j∈Mi(x)
wk1 = 2
∑
k∈B
wk1
∑
j∈Mi(x)
1 = 2
∑
k∈B
wk1xi,k ≤ 2c, (12)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.5. We know that,
E [Xk,j] =
∑
{i∈M: j∈Mi(x)}
vj
1 + αi
.
We can upper and lower bound the above expression as follows:
wk1ck,j
2c+ 1
≤ µk,j = E [Xk,j] ≤ 2wk1ck,j, (13)
where we used wk1 ≤ vj ≤ 2wk1 , ck,j =
∑
{i∈M: j∈Mi(x)}
1 (as in defined Algorithm 2) and αi ≤ 2c
for all i ∈ M (Equation (12)).
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For all buckets k ∈ B, we divide our analysis into two separate cases, depending on the type of
supplier j ∈ Sk.
Case 1: Supplier j ∈ Sk satisfies wk1ck,j > 1. In this case,
P
(
Xk,j ≤
wk1ck,j
2(2c + 1)
)
≤ P
(
Xk,j ≤
(
1−
1
2
)
µk,j
)
≤ exp
(
−
µk,j
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
1
8(2c+ 1)
)
≤ 1−
e− 1
8e(2c + 1)
.
(14)
The first inequality follows by Equation (13), and the second inequality follows by the Chernoff
bound. The third inequality follows by combining Equation (13) with wk1ck,j > 1, and the final
inequality follows by the known fact that, for any x ∈ [0, 1] we have e−x ≤ 1− e−1e x (see Fact 3 in
Appendix A).
We can now calculate the expected value of Yk,j.
E [Yk,j] = P (Yk,j = 1) =
∑
a
P (Yk,j = 1|Xk,j = a)P (Xk,j = a) ≥
1
2
∑
a
a
qk2 + a
P (Xk,j = a)
≥
1
2
1
2(2c+ 1)
wk1ck,j
qk2 + wk1ck,j
P
(
Xk,j ≥
wk1ck,j
4(2c + 1)
)
≥
1
2(2c + 1)
wk1ck,j
4qk2
e− 1
8e(2c + 1)
.
(15)
The first inequality follows from (11). For the second inequality, we consider only those a that sat-
isfy a ≥ 12(2c+1)wk1ck,j, and for all such a we have
a
qk2+a
≥ 12(2c+1)
wk1ck,j
qk2+wk1ck,j
. In the final inequality
we use Equation (14) to lower bound the probability term, and use the fact that ck,j ≤ 2 +
qk2
2wk1
(Lemma 4.6), which further implies that wk1ck,j ≤ 2wk1 +
qk2
2 ≤ 3qk2 .
Case 2: Supplier j ∈ Sk satisfies wk1ck,j ≤ 1. In this case,
P (Xk,j = 0) =
∏
{i∈M: j∈Mi(x)}
P (i does not pick j) =
∏
{i∈M: j∈Mi(x)}
(
1−
vj
1 + αi
)
≤
(
1−
wk1
2c+ 1
)ck,j
≤ exp
(
−
wk1ck,j
2c+ 1
)
≤ 1−
e− 1
e
wk1ck,j
2c+ 1
.
(16)
The second equality follows from the fact that, for all i such that j ∈ Mi(x), the probability that
i picks j ∈ Sk is equal to
vj
1+αi
. Further, we have that
vj
1+αi
is greater than wk1/(2c + 1) because
αi ≤ 2c (Equation (12)). Further, there are ck,j customers i such that j ∈ Mi(x), which gives us
the first inequality. The final inequality follows from Fact 2 and Fact 3 respectively in Appendix A.
We can now bound E [Yk,j] as follows
E [Yk,j] = P (Yk,j = 1) =
∑
a
P (Yk,j = 1|Xk,j = a)P (Xk,j = a) ≥
1
2
∑
a
a
qk2 + a
P (Xk,j = a)
≥
1
2
1
qk2 + 1
P (Xk,j ≥ 1) ≥
1
4qk2
e− 1
e
wk1ck,j
2c+ 1
.
(17)
The first inequality follows from Equation (11) and the second inequality follows because aqk2+a
≥
1
qk2+1
for all a ≥ 1. The final inequality follows from Equation (16).
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Now combining the two cases together for all buckets k ∈ B, we have,
E [Yk] =
∑
j∈Sk
E [Yk,j] ≥
∑
j∈Sk
C
wk1ck,j
qk2
=
∑
i
C
wk1xi,k
qk2
(18)
for constant C = e−1
64e(2c+1)2
. The inequality follows by combining Equations (17) and (15) together
and the final equality follows from Lemma 4.6. Now, given Mi(x) for all i ∈ M, let M be the
random variable counting the number of matched suppliers. We have M =
∑
k∈BYk, and taking
expectation on both sides and further lower bounding this quantity we get,
E [M] =
∑
k
E [Yk] ≥ C
∑
k
∑
i
wk1xi,k
qk2
≥
C
2
lpopt (19)
and we have a c′′ = C2 approximation to the optimum menu via Lemma 4.3.
5 Proof overview of the high value supplier’s case
In this section, we focus on the case where all suppliers j ∈ N have scores vj ≥ 1 and provide an
efficient algorithm that produces menu set which is a constant factor approximation to the expected
number of matches achieved by the optimal menu.
Similar to Section 4 we start by providing an upper bound to the expected number of matches
achieved by the optimal menu. Our upper bound, described in the following lemma, is different
from the one in the previous section. It is worth highlighting, howver, that the upper bound does
not make any assumptions on the vjs ans thus it is also valid for the low-value suppliers’ setting
described before.
Lemma 5.1. Let m and n be the number of customers and suppliers, respectively. Then, the
expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu (opt) is upper bounded by,
max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj=m}
n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
(20)
The proof of Lemma 5.1 can be found in Appendix D. Intuitively, imagine an alternative setting
where the platform can present one option to each customer and she will choose this option with
probability one (equivalently, suppose that customers do not have outside options). In that setting,
the optimal strategy for the platform is to present each customer with a single supplier; this
way, the platform avoids the risk of coordination failures, leading to many customers choosing the
same supplier. Then, optimization problem in (20) essentially provides the optimal solution to the
platform’s problem in this alternate setting. Moreover, as the platform faces no uncertainty on the
customer side in the alternate setting, its solution provides an upper bound to our original problem.
Note that the above problem is a discrete problem. The following lemma shows that there exist
an efficient algorithm to solve the optimization problem (20) up to a multiplicative 1/2 approxi-
mation.
Lemma 5.2. There exists an efficient algorithm whose output is an integral vector y ∈ Zn≥0 that
satisfies
∑n
j=1 yj = m and
n∑
j=1
yj
yj + qj
≥
1
2
max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj=m}
n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
. (21)
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The proof can be found in Appendix D. In what follows, using the solution y identified in the
above lemma to construct a menus set that matches the upper bound in (20) up to a constant
factor. We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (High-value suppliers). Suppose that vj ≥ 1 for all j ∈ N . Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm for constructing menus for each customer i ∈ M, such that, the expected number
of matches is at least a constant fraction αH of the expected number of matches achieved by the
optimal menu set, where αH is some absolute constant.
Proof. Let y∗ be a 12 -approximate solution to the optimization problem in (20). Recall that, by
Lemma 5.2, such a solution exists and can be computed efficiently. Now, by Lemma 5.1, we have
that
1
2
opt ≤
n∑
j=1
y∗j
y∗j + qj
.
Next, we show a construction of menus for customers that approximates this upper bound up
to a constant factor.
Consider the following construction of menus Mi for all i ∈ M. Set Mi = {j} for some y
∗
j
number of customers. Since
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j = m, this is a valid menu, i.e., we can find a non-overlapping
partition of customers such that each partition is shown the same supplier j (and just j).
Now lets calculate the expected number of matches given these menus. Given menus {Mi}i∈M,
let Xj for all j ∈ N be a random variable counting the number of customers that selected supplier
j. Further, let Yj be the random variable denoting whether supplier j is matched or not. Then,
E [Yj] = E [E [Yj|Xj]] = E
[
Xj
Xj + qj
]
=
y∗j∑
a=0
a
a+ qj
P (Xj = a)
≥
∑
a≥y∗j /4
1
4
y∗j
y∗j + qj
P (Xj = a) ≥
1
4
y∗j
y∗j + qj
P
(
Xj ≥ y
∗
j/4
)
.
(22)
To lower bound the quantity P
(
Xj ≥ y
∗
j/4
)
, first observe that
E [Xj ] =
∑
{i∈M: j∈Mi}
vj
vj + 1
≥
y∗j
2
, (23)
where in the inequality above we used the fact that vj ≥ 1 and there are y
∗
j number of customers
for which j ∈Mi.
An upper bound on the quantity P
(
Xj ≤ y
∗
j/4
)
when y∗j ≥ 1 can be obtained as follows:
P
(
Xj ≤ y
∗
j/4
)
≤ P (Xj ≤ (1− 1/2)E [Xj]) ≤ exp
(
−E [Xj]
12
)
≤ exp (−1/24) (24)
For the first inequality, note that by Equation (23), we have that y∗j ≤ 2E [Xj]. The second
inequality follows from the standard Chernoff bound, and the third one from the fact that E [Xj ] ≥
1/2 (by Equation (23) combined with y∗j ≥ 1).
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Combining Equations (24) and (22), we get
E [Yj ] ≥
1
4
y∗j
y∗j + qj
P
(
Xj ≥ y
∗
j /4
)
≥
1
4
y∗j
y∗j + qj
(1− exp (−1/24))
Therefore, the expected number of matches produced by our algorithm is lower bounded by,
n∑
j=1
E [Yj] ≥ α2
n∑
j=1
y∗j
y∗j + qj
≥ α2 ∗ opt
for constant α2 = 1/8(1 − exp (−1/24)). Hence, we have a constant factor approximation for this
case.
6 Simulations
In the previous sections we focused on constructing an efficient algorithm with constant-factor
approximation guarantees. To gain a better understanding of the performance of the proposed
algorithm under perhaps more natural conditions, we provide a series of simulations that compare
the expected number of matches achieved by our algorithm to those achieved by an upper bound.
To test the performance of our algorithm we report the results for markets with 100 suppliers
and vary the number of customers m, and the values of the suppliers and their outside options. We
focus on the low-value supplier regime, where vj ≤ 1 and qj ≥ 1 for all suppliers j ∈ N . Specifically,
we generate the value of the suppliers as vj = 1/(1 + zj) where the zj’s are i.i.d. draws from an
exponential distribution with parameter λv. Note that, as λv increases, the value of the suppliers
becomes smaller in expectation. The value of the outside options are given by qj = 1 + wj where
the wj’s are i.i.d. draws from an exponential distribution with parameter λo.
3
For each combination of (m,λv , λo), we generate 25 instances, where each instance is constructed
by drawing a set of vjs and qjs according to the given distributions. For each instance, we compute
the upper bound as well as the menu set prescribed by our algorithm. To calculate the expected
number of matches resulting from our algorithm, for each instance we run 30 simulations of the
choices and report the average number of matches obtained. Results are summarized in Table 1.
A major challenge in testing the performance of our algorithm is the difficulty in producing
a tight upper bound in for the low-value supplier setting. For simplicity, we will use the linear
relaxation of the upper bound provided in Lemma 5.1. However, as discussed in Section 5, the
aforementioned bound works as an upper bound to the problem even in a setting where costumers
do not have outside options. Recall that, in these simulations, we are assuming that costumers
have an outside option whose value has been normalized to 1, while the value of each supplier is at
most one. Therefore, we do expect to see some loss associated to using this upper bound.
Surprisingly, we observe that our algorithm is able to perform well even against this upper
bound. In particular, we observe that at least 1/3 of the profit is consistently achieved throughout
the test instances.
3To test the robustness of the reported numbers, we ran the simulations with varying number of suppliers and
using different distributions to determine the values of the vjs and qjs. Results are qualitatively the same, and are
omitted for the sake of brevity.
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m λv λo Avg[ALG] Avg[UB] Mean Min Median
50
1 1 10.63 23.50 0.45 0.43 0.45
1 10 5.76 12.17 0.47 0.42 0.47
10 1 9.67 23.78 0.41 0.38 0.41
10 10 5.44 12.47 0.44 0.40 0.44
75
1 1 13.73 30.88 0.44 0.42 0.44
1 10 7.50 15.91 0.47 0.44 0.47
10 1 12.27 30.67 0.40 0.37 0.40
10 10 7.00 15.64 0.45 0.39 0.45
100
1 1 16.04 36.74 0.44 0.41 0.44
1 10 8.83 18.97 0.47 0.43 0.47
10 1 14.00 36.63 0.38 0.35 0.38
10 10 8.21 18.87 0.44 0.40 0.43
125
1 1 17.22 41.40 0.42 0.38 0.42
1 10 9.78 20.77 0.47 0.42 0.48
10 1 15.57 41.37 0.38 0.35 0.38
10 10 9.55 21.29 0.45 0.43 0.45
150
1 1 18.48 45.98 0.40 0.38 0.40
1 10 10.90 23.38 0.47 0.42 0.47
10 1 16.75 45.72 0.37 0.33 0.37
10 10 10.17 23.30 0.44 0.41 0.44
200
1 1 20.49 52.36 0.39 0.37 0.39
1 10 12.49 27.29 0.46 0.41 0.45
10 1 18.83 52.71 0.36 0.34 0.36
10 10 11.93 27.44 0.44 0.37 0.44
Table 1: Simulation results for markets with 100 suppliers, andm customers. For each combination
of (m,λv, λo), we generated 25 instances, where in each instance the value of the suppliers is
vj = 1/(1 + zj) where the zj ’s are i.i.d. draws from an exponential distribution with parameter
λv; the value of the outside options are given by qj = 1 + wj where the wj ’s are i.i.d. draws from
an exponential distribution with parameter λo. Avg[ALG] reports the average number of matches
achieved by our algorithm across instances and simulations; Avg[UB] reports the average of the
upper bound across instances. For each instance, we calculate Avg[matches in algorithm]/UB;
Mean, Min, and Median report the corresponding quantities across the 25 instances.
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7 Conclusion and open questions
Platforms for two-sided markets face the challenging task of providing their users with match rec-
ommendations. Taking an algorithmic approach to this challenge, this paper introduced a stylized
two-stage model for assortment planning in two-sided matching markets. Agents in the model have
public scores as well as an outside option score and agents’ choices from given menus follow a
distribution proportionate to the relevant scores. The key contribution is an algorithm that con-
struct menus that are shown to customers that provides a constant approximation algorithm to the
optimal expected number of matches.
Several open questions follow directly from this work. The first question is to improve the upper
bound and further provide a non-trivial lower bound. Second, one could try to formally address
the case in which customers are indeed different. We believe that the same techniques will provide
a constant-factor approximation algorithm if customers have a publicly known score. Third, is to
allow agents to have different types, thus having agents disagree over public scores. We believe
that, as long as there is a constant fraction of each type of agents, there is an efficient algorithm
that yields a constant-factor approximation.
Other directions we find intriguing are the following. First, the platform could determine not
only the menus but also which set of agents should choose first, a decision that has been proved
to greatly impact the outcome in other settings (see, e.g., Kanoria and Saban (2017)). Second, the
platform could allow for a constant number of substitutions, thus allowing a “rejected” agent to
choose another partner from her menu; see Liu et al. (2019) who take a multi-arm bandit approach
to a similar problem. Finally, it would be interesting to extend this setting to allow for more general
choice models.
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A Useful Machinery for the Proofs
First we state some standard inequalities which we shall use throughout the proof section.
Fact 1 (Jensen’s Inequality). If X is a random variable and f is any concave function then,
E [f(X)] ≤ f(E [X]).
Fact 2. For any x ∈ R, the following holds: 1− x ≤ e−x.
Fact 3. For any x ∈ [0, 1]R, the following holds: e
−x ≤ 1− e−1e x.
Fact 4 (Chernoff bound). Suppose X1, . . . ,Xn are independent random variables taking values in
{0, 1}. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and let µ = E [X]. Then for any δ ∈ [0, 1]R,
P (X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ exp
(
−
µδ2
3
)
P (X ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ exp
(
−
µδ2
2
)
.
We state and prove a technical lemma that lower bounds the expected number of distinct elements
observed after n draws from a distribution close to uniform.
Lemma A.1 (Distinct elements lemma). Let p = (p1, . . . pn) be a discrete distribution over n
elements that satisfies pi ≤ c ∗ pj for all i, j ∈ [1, n]Z and some fixed c > 1. Given m i.i.d samples
from distribution p, the expected number of distinct elements observed is at least,
e− 1
2e
min(m,n)
c
.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume p1 ≤ p2 · · · ≤ pn. Note that pn ≥
1
n∗c , else we know that
pi ≤ c ∗ pn < 1/n and
∑
i pi < 1, which is a contradiction. Hence pn ≥
1
n∗c which further implies
pi ≥
1
n∗c for all i = 1 . . . n.
• m ≤ n. Let Xi be a binary random variable that is 1 if the i
th element appears at least
once in the m samples. We know that the probability P (Xi = 0) = (1 − pi)
m, and therefore
E [Xi] = 1 − (1 − pi)
m. Now the expected number of distinct elements seen after m samples from
distribution p is given by:
E
[
n∑
i=1
Xi
]
=
n∑
i=1
E [Xi] =
n∑
i=1
(1− (1− pi)
m) ≥
n∑
i=1
(1− (1−
1
n ∗ c
)m)
≥
n∑
i=1
1− e−m/(n∗c) ≥
n∑
i=1
(1− (1−
e− 1
2e
m
n ∗ c
)) ≥
e− 1
2e
m
c
,
where the second last uses a standard inequality. 4
• m > n. Since the expected number of distinct elements seen after m samples is monotonically
increasing in m, we can lower bound this case by assuming m = n. More formally, the expected
number of distinct elements seen after m samples is
n∑
i=1
(1− (1− pi)
m) ≥
n∑
i=1
(1− (1−
1
n ∗ c
)n) ≥
e− 1
2e
n
c
.
Combining the two cases above gives us the proof.
Lemma A.2 (Pomatto et al. (2018)). Suppose X stochastically dominates X′ and Z is independent
of X and X′, then X+ Z stochastically dominates X′ + Z
4
a
−x
≤
a−1
a
x for all x ∈ [0, 1], a ≥ 1.
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B Proofs omitted in Section 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the sake of completeness, we start by defining the 3-partition formally below.
Definition 2 (3-partition problem). Given a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} of n = 3m positive integers,
and another positive integer B, such that B4 < aj <
B
2 for all aj ∈ A, and such that
∑
aj∈A
aj = mB;
can A be partitioned into m disjoint sets A1, A2, . . . , Am such that
∑
a∈Ai
a = B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m?
Note the conditions in the above problem implies that each Ai must contain exactly three
elements from A.
Lemma B.1 (Garey and Johnson (2002)). The 3-partition problem is strongly NP-Complete.
We now reduce the above 3-partition problem into an instance of the sequential assortment
problem.
Reduction 1. Our reduction works as follows:
1. Let n be the number of suppliers, where supplier j ∈ N has score vj defined as follows:
vj =
aj∑
j′∈N aj′
Note that
∑
j vj = 1, and so we normalize these scores only for convenience; see proof of
proposition 1. Each supplier has outside option qj = 0.
2. Let m = n3 be the number of customers. Each customer has an outside option equal to v0.
To simplify notation in the subsequent lemmas, we allow v0 to be arbitrary. In the proof of
Proposition 1 we show how this is without loss of generality, as we can always re-scale the
scores vjs so as to have v0 = 1.
Define vmin = minj∈N vj and vmax = maxj∈N vj.
Lemma B.2. Let m and n be the number of customers and suppliers. Let vj > 0 be the score of
supplier j ∈ N and suppose that
∑
j vj = 1. If v0 <
v3
min
4k , then the optimal menus for customers
are disjoint.
Proof. Denote the set of customers by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and the set of suppliers by N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Let the optimal menus be given by M¯ = {Mi}i∈M. We prove the statement by
contradiction. To that end, assume, without loss of generality, that there exists a supplier h ∈ N ,
that belongs to menus of both customer 1 and customer 2, i.e., h ∈M1∩M2. LetM be the random
variable denoting the number of matches under the optimal menus M¯.
We next calculate the probability that customers 1 and 2 both end up choosing supplier h. To
that end, let X1,h,X2,h denote the indicator variables corresponding to whether customers 1, 2,
respectively, choose supplier h. Let α1
def
=
∑
j∈M1
vj , and α2
def
=
∑
j∈M2
vj, and note that, by the
definition of the vjs, we have α1, α2 ≤ 1. Then,
P (X1,h = 1;X2,h = 1) =
v2h
(α1 + v0)(α2 + v0)
≥
v2h
(1 + v0)2
,
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where the equality follows from the fact that consumers’ choices are independent.
Now, whenever customers 1 and 2 both choose supplier h, we must have a matching of size at
most m− 1 as, by definition, we have m < n. Therefore,
P (M ≤ m− 1) ≥ P (X1,h = 1;X2,h = 1) ≥
v2h
(1 + v0)2
.
Using the above observation to bound E [M], we get
E [M] ≤ mP (M = m) + (m− 1)P (M ≤ m− 1)
= m(1− P (M ≤ m− 1)) + (m− 1)P (M ≤ m− 1)
= m− P (M ≤ m− 1)
≤ m−
v2h
(1 + v0)2
≤ m−
v2min
(1 + v0)2
.
(25)
Consider the following disjoint menus M ′i for customers i ∈M:
M ′i
def
= {vi}.
In other words, the i-th customer just observes i-th supplier, and since m ≤ n this is a valid
assignment (and all menus are disjoint). We will show that there exists a v0 for which these new
disjoint menus ({M ′i}i∈M), despite disregarding suppliers in the set [m + 1, n], perform strictly
better than the optimal menus {Mi}i∈M defined earlier, thus reaching a contradiction.
Let M′ be the expected size of the matching under menus {M ′i}i∈m. Then,
E
[
M′
]
=
m∑
i=1
vi
v0 + vi
=
m∑
i=1
(
1−
v0
vi + v0
)
≥
m∑
i=1
(
1−
v0
vmin + v0
)
= m
(
1−
v0
vmin + v0
)
, (26)
where we used the fact that the menus are disjoint and that each supplier has qj = 0.
If v0 <
v3
min
4m , this implies that note that 0 <
v3
min
4m < 1, and from Equation (25) above we obtain
E [M] ≤ m−
v2min
(1 + v0)2
≤ m−
v2min
4
.
And from Equation (26), we get
E
[
M′
]
≥ m
(
1−
v0
vmin + v0
)
≥ m
(
1−
v0
vmin
)
.
Finally,
v0 <
v3min
4m
=⇒ m−
v2min
4
< m
(
1−
v0
vmin
)
=⇒ E [M] < E
[
M′
]
,
which is a contradiction to the optimality of M¯
Lemma B.3. Consider the instance constructed in Reduction 1. The menus {Mi}i∈M are said to
be balanced if ∑
j∈Mi
vj =
1
m
, ∀i ∈ M.
Whenever the optimal menus are disjoint, and it is feasible to construct balanced menus, the optimal
menus {Mi}i∈M are balanced.
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Proof. Let {Mi}i∈M be the optimal menus and suppose they are disjoint and that it is feasible to
construct balanced menus. Let M be the expected size of the matching given the optimal menus
{Mi}i∈M Define αi =
∑
j∈Mi
vj.
Given that the optimal menus are disjoint, we have
∑
i∈M αi ≤
∑
j∈N vj ≤ 1. Therefore,
E [M] =
∑
i∈M
αi
v0 + αi
≤ max
{x∈Rm |
∑
i∈M xi≤1}
∑
i∈M
xi
v0 + xi
= m(
1/m
v0 + 1/m
) =
m
mv0 + 1
.
The third equality follows because, given any constant v0 > 0, the function
∑
i∈M
xi
v0+xi
is concave
in x, and the maximum under the constraint
∑
i∈M xi ≤ 1 is achieved when xi =
1
m for all i ∈ M.
Note that, if it is feasible to construct balanced menus, then this bound is achieved at equality by
any balanced menus.
Proposition 1. The two-sided sequential assortment problem is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the sequential assortment problem is not strongly NP-hard.
This implies that there exists an algorithm that solves the Sequential Assortment problem whose
running time is polynomial in the size of the input.
Now, given an instance of the 3-partition problem, we can reduce it to an instance of the
Sequential Assortment problem as in Reduction 1 above. By way of Lemma B.2, as long as we
define v0 =
v3min
8m ≤
v3min
4m , the optimal menus will be disjoint. To be consistent with our definition
of the Sequential Assortment in Section 2, we can re-scale v0 to 1, and all other values vj by
8m
v3min
,
and by the scale invariance of the MNL model, the optimal solution to the problem remains the
same. Note that this value 8m
v3min
is polynomial in the size of the input of the 3-partition instance.
It is easy to see, using Lemma B.3, that whenever an instance of the 3-partition problem has
a feasible partition, the optimal menus of the corresponding instance of the Sequential Assortment
problem are balanced.
Therefore, a weakly polynomial time algorithm for the Sequential Assortment problem is enough
to solve the 3-partition problem in wealy polynomial time.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem 3.4. Fix the set of customers M and set of suppliers N with associated non-negative
public scores {vj}j∈N and non-negative outside option scores {qj}j∈N . Suppose that there exist
efficient algorithms that achieve an approximation ratio of αL and αH for the low- and high-value
supplier cases, respectively. Then, there exists an efficient algorithm for the general two-sided
sequential assortment optimization problem such that the expected number of matches is at least a
fraction 12 min{αL, αH} of the expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu set.
Proof. Define OPT (t,X) as the maximum possible expected number of matches in a market with
t customers and a set X ⊆ N of suppliers with their associated public scores {vj}j∈X and outside
option scores {qj}j∈X .
Let A be the set of suppliers with scores vj ≥ 1 and B be the set of suppliers with scores vj < 1.
Hence we have A ∪B = N and A ∩B = ∅.
For ease of exposition, assume that m, the number of customers, is even; the proof can be
trivially adapted if not. Suppose that the following inequality holds
OPT (m,A ∪B) ≤ 2
[
OPT
(m
2
, A
)
+OPT
(m
2
, B
)]
. (27)
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By Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, we have algorithms AL and AH that achieve a constant
approximation ratio of αL and αH for the low and high-value supplier cases, respectively. Let
MAL denote the number of matches achieved by algorithm AL in a market with m/2 customers
and the set of suppliers given by A and let MAH denote the number of matches achieved by al-
gorithm AH in a market with m/2 customers and the set of suppliers given by B. Then, we have
that E [MAL ] ≥ αLOPT (
m
2 , A) and E [MAH ] ≥ αHOPT (
m
2 , B). Combining these two observations
along with the inequality in (27), we obtain the desired approximation ratio of 12 min{αL, αH} for
OPT (m,A ∪B).
Therefore, to complete the proof it remains to show that the inequality in Equation (27) holds.
To that end, let the optimal menu to the original problem be given by M¯ = {Mi}i∈M, that is, the
expected number of matches achieved by M¯ = {Mi}i∈M is equal to OPT (m,N = A ∪B).
Construct the modified menu set as follows. Let M¯A be such that MAi = Mi ∩A. Then, for a
given customer i and any supplier j ∈ A such that j ∈ A, we have that under the menu set M¯ , the
probability that i chooses j is given by
pi,j ,
vj
1 +
∑
j′∈Mi
vj′
.
and under the menu set M¯ the same probability is
pAi,j ,
vj
1 +
∑
j′∈Mi∩A
vj′
.
Then, it is immediate to see that
pAi,j ≥ pi,j for all j ∈ A and all i such that j ∈Mi. (28)
Let pj(l) and p
A
j (l) be the probability that l customers choose supplier j under M¯ and M¯
A, re-
spectively. As a consequence of Equation (28), we must have pj(l) ≤ p
A
j (l) for all possible values of l.
Let Yj (resp. Y
A
j ) be an indicator variable denoting whether j ∈ A gets matched or not under
M¯ (resp. M¯A). We can then write
E [Yj ] = E [E [Yj |Xj ]] = E
[
Xj
qj +Xj
]
and E
[
YAj
]
= E
[
E
[
YAj |X
A
j
]]
= E
[
XAj
qj +X
A
j
]
,
where Xj (resp. X
A
j ) are random variables representing the number of customers that choose
supplier j. These random variables can be written as
Xj =
∑
i
Xi,j and X
A
j =
∑
i
XAi,j, (29)
with Xi,j (resp. X
A
i,j) representing an indicator random variable denoting whether customer i
chooses supplier j or not. From Equations (28) and (29), we can see that XAj stochastically
dominates Xj for all suppliers j ∈ A. Consequently E
[
YAj
]
≥ E [Yj ].
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Then, we have that ∑
j∈A
E [Yj] ≤
∑
j∈A
E
[
YAj
]
. (30)
Analogously, we can repeat the above exercise for set B to ultimately conclude that∑
j∈B
E [Yj] ≤
∑
j∈B
E
[
YBj
]
. (31)
Let OPTA and OPTB denote the expected number of matches achieved by the suppliers in A
and B respectively under the optimal menu M¯ . Then,
OPT (m,A ∪B) = OPTA +OPTB. (32)
Combining Equations (30) to (32) we have,
OPT (m,A ∪B) = OPTA +OPTB
=
∑
j∈A
E [Yj] +
∑
j∈B
E [Yj]
≤
∑
j∈A
E
[
YAj
]
+
∑
j∈B
E
[
YBj
]
≤ OPT (m,A) +OPT (m,B).
We show next that
OPT (m,A) +OPT (m,B) ≤ 2
[
OPT
(m
2
, A
)
+OPT
(m
2
, B
)]
. (33)
To prove the above inequality, it suffices to show that OPT (t,X) ≤ tt−1OPT (t− 1,X), for any
t ≥ 2 and any given set of suppliers X. To see why this is true, let I denote the instance with t
customers and a set of supplier given by X, where customers are shown an optimal assortment Z
that achieves OPT (t,X).
Fix a customer k, discard that customer and consider the resulting number of matches in an
instance I ′k where X is the set of suppliers and the t−1 remaining customers are shown the menu in
Z. Let pk(t,X) denote the probability that customer k is matched in instance I. We will show that
OPT (t,X) ≤ OPT (t− 1,X) + pk(t,X). As k is arbitrary, the inequality holds for all customers.
With some abuse of notation, we override Yj and Y
′
j to be indicator variables denoting whether
j ∈ X gets matched in instances I and I ′, respectively. For all i ∈ M, let Xi,j for all j ∈ X and
X′i,j for all j ∈ X be the indicator random variable denoting if i picks j for instance I and I
′,
respectively. Note that Xi,j and X
′
i,j are identically distributed for all i 6= k, as consumers see the
same assortments in both instances and consumer choices are independent.
Further for each j ∈ X we have that:
E [Yj|Xi,j for all i ∈ M] =
∑
iXi,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
, and E [Yj] = E
[ ∑
iXi,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
.
Moreover, if j /∈ Zk, we have E [Yj] = E
[ ∑
i Xi,j
qj+
∑
i Xi,j
]
= E
[ ∑
i X
′
i,j
qj+
∑
i X
′
i,j
]
= E
[
Y′j
]
.
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On the other hand, if j ∈ Zk, we have
E [Yj] = E
[ ∑
iXi,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
≤ E
[ ∑
i 6=kXi,j
qj +
∑
i 6=kXi,j
+
Xk,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
= E
[ ∑
i 6=kX
′
i,j
qj +
∑
i 6=kX
′
i,j
]
+ E
[
Xk,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
= E
[
Y′j
]
+ E
[
Xk,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
Therefore,
OPT (t,X) =
∑
j∈X
E [Yj] ≤
∑
j∈X
E
[
Y′j
]
+
∑
{j: j∈Zk}
E
[
Xk,j
qj +
∑
iXi,j
]
≤ OPT (t− 1,X) + pk(t,X).
Therefore, by discarding a customer k∗ = argmink pk(t,X), and maintaining the same assort-
ment that achieves OPT (t,X), the expected number of ensuing matches is at least t−1t OPT (t,X).
Consequently, we have OPT (t,X) ≤ tt−1OPT (t− 1,X), and thus we obtain, as desired (33).
C Proofs omitted in Section 4
Lemma 4.1. Fix any feasible menu set {Mi}i∈M for customers, and let M and M
′ be the random
variables counting the number of matches obtained when using {Mi}i∈M in the original and in the
new setting, respectively. Then,
E
[
M′
]
≤ E [M] ≤ 2E
[
M′
]
.
Proof. Given the menu set {Mi}i∈M for customers, let Xj andX
′
j for all j ∈ N be random variables
counting the number of customers that match to supplier j in original and new setting, respectively.
Similarly let Yj and Y
′
j for all j ∈ N be random variables that denotes if supplier j is matched in
the original and new setting respectively. Then,
E [M] =
n∑
j=1
E [Yj ] and E
[
M′
]
=
n∑
j=1
E
[
Y′j
]
. (34)
Note that the scores vj and v
′
j for all j ∈ N are the same in both settings. Therefore, for all
j ∈ N , the random variables Xj and X
′
j are identically distributed. Further for all j ∈ N\S, the
outside options qj and q
′
j are the same and therefore E [Yj] = E
[
Y′j
]
.
We consider suppliers j ∈ S and recall qj < 1 and q
′
j = 1 for all these suppliers. Note,
E [Yj ] = E
[
Xj
Xj+qj
]
and E
[
Y′j
]
= E
[
X
′
j
X
′
j+1
]
. Since Xj (and X
′
j) takes only non-negative integral
value, we have
Xj
Xj+1
≤
Xj
Xj+qj
≤ 2
Xj
Xj+1
for all Xj ∈ Z≥0 because qj ≤ 1. Combining the above
observations together, we get:
E
[
Xj
Xj + 1
]
≤ E [Yj ] ≤ 2E
[
Xj
Xj + 1
]
and E
[
Y′j
]
= E
[
X′j
X′j + 1
]
.
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Since Xj and X
′
j are identically distributed, we have:
E
[
Y′j
]
≤ E [Yj ] ≤ 2E
[
Y′j
]
.
Summing over all j ∈ N , and using Equation (34), we get
E
[
M′
]
≤ E [M] ≤ 2E
[
M′
]
as desired.
Lemma C.1. Let I be an instance of the problem with m customers and n suppliers, where vj ∈ R
and qj ∈ R denote the score and outside option for supplier j ∈ N . Let I
′ be the instance obtained
from I by removing suppliers j with qj ≥ C. If opt and opt
′ denote the expected size of the matching
under the optimal menus for instances I and I ′ respectively, then:
opt′ ≥ opt−
m
C
.
Proof. Let S and S′ be the set of all suppliers in instance I and I ′ respectively. Let Mi be the menu
for the i’th customer in the optimal menu for instance I. Define M′i
def
= Mi∩S
′ be the menu for i’th
customer for instance I ′. LetYj for j ∈ S andY
′
j for j ∈ S
′ be random variables denoting if supplier
j is matched under instance I and I ′ respectively. Let M and M′ be the random variable denoting
the number of suppliers matched under instances I and I ′ respectively. Then M =
∑
j∈SYj and
M′ =
∑
j∈S′Y
′
j. For all i ∈ M, let Xij for all j ∈ S and X
′
ij for all j ∈ S
′ be the indicator
random variable denoting if i picks j for instance I and I ′ respectively. Define αi
def
=
∑
j∈Mi
vj
and α′i
def
=
∑
j∈M′i
vj . Note for all j ∈ S
′, P (Xij = 1) =
vj
1+αi
and P
(
X′ij = 1
)
=
vj
1+α′i
. Since
αi ≥ α
′
i and Xij,X
′
ij are indicator random variables, we have that X
′
ij stochastically dominates
Xij . Further since all Xij and X
′
ij for all i ∈ M are independent random variables, we have
that X′j =
∑
i∈MX
′
ij stochastically dominates Xj =
∑
i∈MXij (using Lemma A.2 inductively).
This further implies E
[
Y′j
]
≥ E [Yj ], because Yj and Y
′
j are monotone functions in Xj and X
′
j
respectively. Further for each j ∈ S\S′,
E [Yj |Xij for all i ∈ M] =
∑
iXij
qj +
∑
iXij
, and E [Yj] = E
[ ∑
iXij
qj +
∑
iXij
]
.
Using the above expression, we now provide an upper bound for the quantity
∑
j∈S\S′ E [Yj],
∑
j∈S\S′
E [Yj ] =
∑
j∈S\S′
E
[ ∑
iXij
qj +
∑
iXij
]
≤
∑
j∈S\S′
E
[∑
iXij
C
]
≤
m
C
. (35)
For the final inequality, note that
∑
j∈S\S′
∑
iXij is always upper bounded by the number of
customers m. Now we are ready to lower bound the value of opt′,
opt′ =
∑
j∈S′
E
[
Y′j
]
≥
∑
j∈S
E [Yj]−
∑
j∈S\S′
E [Yj ] ≥ opt−
m
C
.
For the second inequality, we used the fact that E
[
Y′j
]
≥ E [Yj ] for all j ∈ S
′. For the last
inequality, we used Equation (35).
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C.1 Proofs omitted in Section 4.2
For convenience, we start by restating optimization problem (8)
fopt =max
x
∑
k∈B
min
{
2
qk2
∑
i∈M
wk1xi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′1xi,k′
, |Sk|
}
s.t. 0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
Lemma 4.2 (fopt upper bounds opt). opt ≤ fopt .
Proof. Let {M∗(i)}i∈M be the optimal menu, where M
∗(i) is menu for customer i. For each bucket
k ∈ B, define x∗i,k to be the number of suppliers from bucket k present in menu M
∗(i). Here we
aim to upper bound the expected number of matches achieved by optimal menu.
Let Xk be the random variable counting the number of customers that choose a supplier in
bucket k, given {M∗(i)}i∈M. Then, by Equation (5), we have
E [Xk] ≤ 2
m∑
i=1
wk1x
∗
i,k
1 +
∑
k′∈B wk′1x
∗
i,k′
.
Let Yk be the random variable counting the number of matches in bucket k for the optimal menu.
Then the expected number of matches from bucket k is equal to E [Yk] and, by Equation (7), this
quantity is upper bounded by:
E [Yk] ≤ min
{
2
qk2
∑
i∈M
wk1x
∗
i,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′1x
∗
i,k′
, |Sk|
}
.
Further note that 0 ≤ x∗i,k ≤ |Sk| and is a feasible solution to optimization problem (8). The
lemma statement then follows by summing over all buckets k.
In the remaining part of this section we provide the proof for Lemma 4.3 by constructing a
sequence of relaxations to problem (8). To that end, consider the following optimization problem.
opt1 =maxx
∑
k
min
{
2
qk2
∑
i∈M
wk1xi,k
1 +
∑
k′ wk′1xi,k′
, |Sk|
}
s.t.
∑
k′∈B
wk′
1
xi,k′ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M,
0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
(36)
Lemma C.2. opt1 ≤ fopt ≤ 2opt1.
Proof. The first inequality opt1 ≤ fopt holds because the feasible region in problem (36) is con-
tained in the one of problem (8), and both problems have the same objective.
To establish the second inequality, let x∗ be the optimal solution to optimization problem (8)
and let x∗i
def
=
∑
k′ wk′1x
∗
i,k′ . We now construct a feasible solution y for problem (36) as follows: For
each i ∈ M,
If x∗i ≤ 1, then define yi,k
def
= x∗i,k for all k ∈ B.
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If x∗i > 1, then define yi,k
def
= x∗i,k
1
x∗i
for all k ∈ B.
Let yi
def
=
∑
k∈B yi,k. Now for each i ∈ M, yi ≤ 1 as
If x∗i ≤ 1, then yi =
∑
k∈B
wkyi,k =
∑
k∈B
wkx
∗
i,k = x
∗
i ≤ 1.
If x∗i > 1, then yi =
∑
k∈B
wkyi,k =
∑
k∈B
(
wkx
∗
i,k
1
x∗i
)
= 1.
Therefore, y is a feasible solution for problem (36) and, further, for each i ∈ M consider each term
in the objective,
If x∗i ≤ 1, then
wkyi,k
1 + yi
=
wkx
∗
i,k
1 + x∗i
.
If x∗i > 1, then
wkyi,k
1 + yi
=
wk
x∗
i,k
x∗i
1 + 1
=
wkx
∗
i,k
2x∗i
≥
wkx
∗
i,k
2(1 + x∗i )
.
The lemma statement follows because y approximates x∗ by 1/2 for each summation term in the
objective.
Next we provide the second optimization problem that approximates optimization problem (36)
and in the following lemma we provide the explicit approximation factor.
opt2 =maxx
∑
k∈B
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k, |Sk|
}
s.t.
∑
k′∈B
wk′
1
xi,k′ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M,
0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
(37)
Lemma C.3 (opt1 and opt2 approximate each other). opt1 ≤ opt2 ≤ 2opt1.
Proof. The left hand side inequality opt1 ≤ opt2 is trivial and follows by comparing the objectives
in both problems. We now show the remaining inequality. Under the constraint
∑
k′∈Bwk′xi,k′ ≤ 1
for all i ∈ M, we have
1
2qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k ≤
1
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′xi,k′
for all k ∈ B.
The above inequality further implies that, for each k ∈ B
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k
1 +
∑
k′∈Bwk′xi,k′
, |Sk|
}
≥ min
{
2
2qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k, |Sk|
}
≥
1
2
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkxi,k, |Sk|
}
The proof follows by summing the above equation for all k ∈ B.
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We now recall our LP formulation that upper bounds the expected number of matches in the
optimal menu. Further, in our following lemma which show that optimum values of LP formulation
and optimization problem (37) are equal. Now recall optimization problem (9),
lpopt =max
x
∑
k
2
qk2
∑
i∈M
wk1xi,k
s.t.
∑
k′∈B
wk′
1
xi,k′ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ M,
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all k ∈ B
0 ≤ xi,k ≤ |Sk| for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B .
Lemma C.4. opt2 = lpopt
Proof. Clearly, lpopt ≤ opt2. Next we show the other inequality. Let x
∗ be the optimum solution
for opt2. Now consider the following solution,
yi,k = x
∗
i,k
qk2
2
|Sk|∑m
i′=1 wkx
∗
i′,k
for all i ∈ M if
2
qk2
m∑
i′=1
wkx
∗
i′,k > |Sk|
yi,k = x
∗
i,k for all i ∈ M if
2
qk2
m∑
i′=1
wkx
∗
i′,k ≤ |Sk|.
Since |Sk| ≥ 1, it is not hard to see that yi,k ≤ x
∗
i,k for all i ∈ M and k ∈ B. Further for each
bucket k ∈ B,
If
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k ≤ |Sk|, then
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkyi,k =
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k ≤ |Sk| (38)
If
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k > |Sk|, then
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkyi,k =
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k
|Sk|∑m
i′=1 wkx
∗
i′,k
= |Sk| (39)
Therefore y is a feasible solution to lpopt and its objective value is,
∑
k∈B
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkyi,k =
∑
{k | 2
qk2
∑m
i=1 wkx
∗
i,k
>|Sk|}
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkyi,k +
∑
{k | 2
qk2
∑m
i=1 wkx
∗
i,k
≤|Sk|}
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkyi,k
=
∑
{k | 2
qk2
∑m
i=1 wkx
∗
i,k
>|Sk|}
|Sk|+
∑
{k | 2
qk2
∑m
i=1 wkx
∗
i,k
≤|Sk|}
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k
=
∑
k∈B
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wkx
∗
i,k, |Sk|
}
(40)
The second equality follows from equations (38) and (39). Therefore lpopt ≥ opt2 as desired.
Lemma 4.3 (lpopt approximates fopt). 12fopt ≤ lpopt ≤ 2fopt.
Proof. The lemma follows by combining lemma C.2, lemma C.3 and lemma C.4.
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C.2 Proofs omitted in Section 4.3
We first state an observation that will be useful for the proofs in this section.
Observation 1 (Lemma C.1). We can assume |B2| = m by ignoring all suppliers with qj ≥ 2
m
and only incur a loss of additive m2m in expected size of the matching. Thereby, we have that∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ ≤ 2 and
∑
k∈B
wk1 ≤ |B2|
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ ≤ 2m.
Lemma 4.5. Algorithm 1 returns an integral solution x that satisfies the following properties:
1.
∑
k∈Bmin
{
2
qk2
∑
i∈Mwk1xi,k, |Sk|
}
≥ 12 lpopt.
2. There exists a constant c ≥ 1 such that
∑
k′∈B wk′1xi,k′ ≤ c for all customers i ∈ M.
3. 2qk2
∑m
i=1 wk1xi,k ≤ |Sk|+
2wk1
qk2
for all k ∈ B.
Proof. Let x∗ be an optimal solution to (9), and lpopt be the corresponding optimal value, and
let x be the corresponding output of the rounding algorithm. For each bucket k,
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k =
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1}
wk1xi,k +
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1}
wk1xi,k,≥ wk1⌈sk⌉+
1
2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1}
wk1x
∗
ik
≥ wk1
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1}
x∗ik +
1
2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1}
wk1x
∗
ik ≥
1
2
m∑
i=1
wk1x
∗
ik .
(41)
The second inequality holds because xi,k ≥
1
2x
∗
i,k for all i, k such that x
∗
ik ≥ 1, and
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1} xi,k =
⌈sk⌉. For the third inequality, note that sk =
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1} x
∗
i,k and sk ≤ ⌈sk⌉.
Now, multiplying both sides of Equation (41) by 2/qk2 , we get
2
qk2
∑
iwk1xi,k ≥
1
2
2
qk2
∑
iwk1x
∗
i,k
that further implies min{ 2qk2
∑
iwk1xi,k, |Sk|} ≥
1
2 min{
2
qk2
∑
i wk1x
∗
i,k, |Sk|}. Now summing over all
buckets k ∈ B, we get:
∑
k∈B
min
{
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1xi,k, |Sk|
}
≥
1
2
∑
k∈B
2
qk2
m∑
i=1
wk1x
∗
i,k = lpopt/2 .
The first inequality follows because 2qk2
∑
i wk1x
∗
i,k ≤ |Sk| is a constraint in problem (9).
We next provide a proof for the second condition. Given an assignment x, we denote W =∑m
i=1
∑
{k∈B | x∗
i,k
<1} wk1xi,k and for each l ∈ B1 defineWℓ
def
=
∑m
i=1
∑
{k∈B∈B | wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1} xi,k
and note that Wℓ =
∑
{k∈B and wk1=ℓ}
⌈sk⌉. Furthermore, W =
∑
l∈B1
l ∗Wℓ. We now provide an
upper bound for W:
W =
m∑
i=1
∑
{k∈B | x∗
i,k
<1}
wk1xi,k =
∑
k∈B
wk1
∑
{i∈M | x∗
i,k
<1}
xi,k =
∑
k∈B
wk1⌈sk⌉
≤
∑
k∈B
wk1
∑
{i∈M | x∗
i,k
<1}
x∗i,k +
∑
k∈B
wk1 ≤ m+ 2m = 3m.
(42)
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In the final expression, we exchanged the orders of summation. Further we used Observation 1
and also used the fact that for each customer i ∈ M,
∑
k∈Bwk1x
∗
i,k ≤ 1, which is a constraint in
problem 9.
Now fix l ∈ B1, for each i ∈ M, we next give an upper bound for the quantity
∑
{k∈B | wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1}wk1xi,k.
∑
{k∈B | wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1}
wk1xi,k = ℓ ∗
∑
{k∈B | wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1}
xi,k ≤ ℓ ∗
(
Wℓ
m
+ 1
)
. (43)
The final inequality in the above expression follows from the assignment of the rounding algorithm.
We are now ready to prove the second condition. For each customer i ∈M,∑
k∈B
wk1xi,k =
∑
{k∈B | x∗
i,k
<1}
wk1xi,k +
∑
{k∈B | x∗
i,k
≥1}
wk1xi,k,
=
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ
∑
{k∈B | wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1}
xi,k + 1 =
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓyi,ℓ + 1,
≤
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ ∗
(
Wℓ
m
+ 1
)
+ 1 =
W
m
+
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ+ 1 ≤ c+ o(1).
(44)
In the second equality, we rearranged the summation and used the fact that
∑
{k∈B: x∗
i,k
≥1} wk1xi,k =∑
{k: x∗
i,k
≥1}wk1⌊x
∗
i,k⌋ ≤
∑
{k: x∗
i,k
≥1}wk1x
∗
i,k ≤ 1 (constraint of optimization problem 9). In the
third equality, we used the fact that
∑
{k∈B: wk1=ℓ and x
∗
i,k
<1} xi,k = yi,ℓ for all ℓ ∈ B1 and i ∈ M
and this follows from the assignment of rounding algorithm. For the fourth inequality, note that
yi,ℓ ≤ 1+
1
m
∑
{k∈B and wk1=ℓ}
⌈sk⌉ = 1+
1
mWℓ. In the final inequality, we used
W
m +
∑
ℓ∈B1
ℓ+1 ≤
1 +O( logmm ) + 2 + 1 ≤ c for some constant c.
All that remains to show is the third condition: 2qk2
∑
i∈Mwk1xi,k ≤ |Sk|+
2wk1
qk2
.
2
qk2
∑
i∈M
wk1xi,k =
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1}
xi,k +
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
>1}
xi,k ≤
2wk1
qk2
⌈sk⌉+
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1}
x∗ik,
≤
2wk1
qk2
(sk + 1) +
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1}
x∗ik ≤
2wk1
qk2
+ |Sk|.
(45)
The first inequality holds because xi,k ≤ x
∗
i,k for all i, k such that x
∗
ik ≥ 1, and
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1} xi,k =
⌈sk⌉. For the second inequality, note that ⌈sk⌉ ≤ sk + 1. In the final inequality, we used the fact
that sk =
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1} x
∗
i,k, combined with
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
<1} x
∗
ik +
2wk1
qk2
∑
{i: x∗
ik
≥1} x
∗
ik ≤ |Sk|, which
is a constraint in optimization problem (9).
Lemma 4.6. The menu Mi(x) for all i ∈ M returned by Algorithm 2 satisfies the following
properties for each bucket k ∈ B
1.
∑
j∈Sk
ck,j =
∑
i∈M xi,k.
2. For all j ∈ Sk, ck,j ≤ 2 +
qk2
2wk1
.
Proof. The first condition follows immediately from the construction of menus. For the second,
observe that
∑
i xi,k ≤
qk2
2wk1
|Sk|+ 1, and ck,j ≤
∑
i xi,k
Sk
+ 1 ≤
qk2
2wk1
+ 1Sk + 1 ≤ 2 +
qk2
2wk1
.
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D Proofs omitted in Section 5
Lemma 5.1. Let m and n be the number of customers and suppliers, respectively. Then, the
expected number of matches achieved by the optimal menu (opt) is upper bounded by,
max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj=m}
n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
(20)
Proof. Given optimal menu, let X∗j for all j ∈ N be the random variable counting the number of
customers that select supplier j. Further, let Y∗j be a random variable denoting if supplier j is
matched. Then,
opt =
n∑
j=1
E
[
Y∗j
]
. (46)
The expected value of E
[
Y∗j
]
can be written as
E
[
Y∗j
]
= E
[
E
[
Y∗j |X
∗
j
]]
= E
[
X∗j
X∗j + qj
]
. (47)
Combining Equations (46) and (47) we obtain
opt = E

 n∑
j=1
X∗j
X∗j + qj


≤
∑
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj≤m}
P
(
X∗j = xj, for all j ∈ N
) n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj


≤ max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj=m}
n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
.
(48)
The first inequality holds because X∗j is a non-negative integer valued random variable, and∑n
j=1X
∗
j ≤ m with probability 1. The last inequality follows because the function
∑n
j=1
xj
xj+qj
is monotone in
∑n
j=1 xj .
Lemma 5.2. There exists an efficient algorithm whose output is an integral vector y ∈ Zn≥0 that
satisfies
∑n
j=1 yj = m and
n∑
j=1
yj
yj + qj
≥
1
2
max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑n
j=1 xj=m}
n∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
. (21)
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . qn. Let x
∗ be the optimum solution
to optimization problem (20). Recall we wish to solve the optimization problem (20) approximately
and it will be convenient to identify indices where x∗i = 0.
It is easy to see that if x∗j = 0, then x
∗
j′ = 0 for all j
′ ≥ j; otherwise, one could simply swap
the values of x∗j and x
∗
j′ and increase the objective. Therefore, we state the following optimization
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problem, indexed by i.
opt(i)
def
= max
{x∈Zn
≥0
:
∑i
j=1 xj=m and xj≥1}
i∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
. (49)
Note the addition of constraint xj ≥ 1 in the above optimization problem. Using the definition of
opt(i), the optimization problem (20) can be equivalently written as:
max
i∈N
opt(i) (50)
To solve the optimization problem (20) approximately (up to a factor of 12) it is enough to solve
optimization problem (49) approximately (up to a factor of 12) for all i ∈ N . Now define the
relaxation of (49) as follows:
copt(i)
def
= max
{x∈Rn:
∑i
j=1 xj=m and xj≥1}
i∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
. (51)
Note all the constraints are linear and the objective is concave in x. Maximizing a concave function
over convex set yields a convex optimization problem and thus can be solved efficiently. Let x′
be the optimum solution for convex optimization problem (51). Consider the following integral
solution:
xj
def
=
{
⌊x′j⌋ for all 2 ≤ j ≤ m
m−
∑i
j=2⌊x
′
j⌋ for j = 1.
(52)
Clearly xj ≥ 1 and
∑i
j=1 xj = m, therefore is a feasible solution to optimization problem (49).
Further note that x1 = m−
∑i
j=2⌊x
′
j⌋ ≥ m−
∑i
j=2 x
′
j = x
′
1, where in the last inequality we used
the constraint
∑i
j=1 x
′
j = m. Since x
′
j ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i, we have xj ≥
1
2x
′
j, which further
implies:
i∑
j=1
xj
xj + qj
≥
1
2
i∑
j=1
x′j
x′j + qj
≥
1
2
opt(i) .
The solution x is a 12 -approximate solution to optimization problem (49) and therefore by iterating
over all i ∈ N and returning the maximum of all these approximate solutions is a 12 -approximate
solution to optimization problem (20).
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